A (public key) Trace and Revoke Scheme combines the functionality of broadcast encryption with the capability of traitor tracing. Specifically, (1) a trusted center publishes a single public key and distributes individual secret keys to the users of the system; (2) anybody can encrypt a message so that all but a specified subset of "revoked" users can decrypt the resulting ciphertext; and (3) if a (small) group of users combine their secret keys to produce a "pirate decoder", the center can trace at least one of the "traitors" given access to this decoder.
Introduction
A broadcast encryption scheme allows the sender to securely distribute data to a dynamically changing set of users over an insecure channel. Namely, it should be possible to selectively exclude (i.e., "revoke") a certain subset of users from receiving the data. For that reason, it is often convenient to think of broadcast encryption as a revocation scheme, since the revocation ability is what makes the task of broadcast encryption non-trivial. In particular, each user should receive an individualized decoder (i.e., a decryption device with a unique secret key) which decrypts only the ciphertexts intended for the given user. Broadcast encryption has numerous applications, including pay-TV systems, distribution of copyrighted material, streaming audio/video and many others.
The formal study of broadcast encryption was initiated by Fiat and Naor [11] , who showed a scheme with message overhead roughly O(z 2 log 2 z log N ), where z is the maximum number of excluded users (so called revocation threshold) and N is the total number of users. Subsequent works include [16, 15, 13] , and, more recently, [18, 14] which show how to achieve linear message overhead O(z) and ω(log N ) storage per user. public key size proportional to the revocation threshold z. The length of each ciphertext, and the time to encrypt and decrypt a message are all proportional to O(z).
As a preliminary step, we show how to modify the CPA-scheme of [21] to achieve a much more appropriate notion of adaptive security, while maintaining essentially the same efficiency in all the parameters (up to a factor of 2).
Of independent interest, we also provide another scheme achieving a slightly weaker (but still very strong) notion of generalized CCA2 security (gCCA2) [20, 1] . As argued in [1] , the gCCA2 security is much more robust to syntactic changes, while still sufficient for all known uses of CCA2 security. Interestingly, all the examples separating CCA2-and gCCA2-secure encryption were "artificial" in a sense that they made a more complicated scheme from an already existing CCA2-secure encryption. Our work shows the first "natural" separation, but for the setting of broadcast public key encryption.
A Note on Traitor Tracing. As first explicitly noticed by Gafni et al. [12] , Broadcast Encryption is most useful when combined with a Traitor Tracing mechanism [6] by which the center can extract the identity of (at least one) "pirate" from any illegal decoder produced combining decryption equipments of a group of legal members (the "traitors"). By slightly modifying standard tracing algorithms from previous weaker schemes (e.g. [19, 21] ), tracing algorithms can be added to our schemes, thus yielding fully functional Trace and Revoke schemes [19] . However, we will focus only on Broadcast Encryption (i.e. revocation), which is also the main novelty of this paper.
Notations and Basic Facts
Lagrange Interpolation in the Exponent. Let q be a prime and f (x) a polynomial of degree z over Z q ; let j 0 , . . . , j z be distinct elements of Z q , and let f 0 = f (j 0 ), . . . , f z = f (j z ). Using Lagrange Interpolation, we can express the polynomial as f (x) = z t=0 (f t · λ t (x)), where λ t (x) = 0≤i =t≤z j i −x j i −jt , t = 0, . . . , z. We can now define the Lagrange Interpolation Operator as follows:
LI(j 0 , . . . , j z ; f 0 , . . . , f z )(x) . = z t=0 (f t · λ t (x)). Now, consider any cyclic group G of order q and a generator g of G. For any distinct values j 0 , . . . , j z of Z q and (non necessarily distinct) elements v 0 , . . . , v z of G, let us define the Lagrange Interpolation Operator in the Exponent as:
EXP-LI(j 0 , . . . , j z ; v 0 , . . . , v z )(x) . = g LI(j 0 ,...,jz;log g v 0 ,...,log g vz)(
The last expression shows that the function EXP-LI is poly-time computable, despite being defined in terms of discrete logarithms (which are usually hard to compute). We also remark on another useful property of the above operator: EXP-LI(j 0 , . . . , j z ; v r 0 , . . . , v r z )(x) = [EXP-LI(j 0 , . . . , j z ; v 0 , . . . , v z )(x)] r . In what follows, we will refer to a function of the form g f (x) , where f (x) is a polynomial, as an EXP-polynomial.
DDH Assumption. The security of our schemes will rely on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption in the group G: namely, it is computationally hard to distinguish a random tuple (g 1 , g 2 , u 1 , u 2 ) of four independent elements in G from a random tuple satisfying log g 1 u 1 = log g 2 u 2 (for a survey, see [3] ).
A Probabilistic Lemma. The following useful lemma states that to estimate the difference between two related experiments U 1 and U 2 , it is sufficient to bound the probability of some event F which "subsumes" all the differences between the experiments. Formally, Lemma 1 If U 1 , U 2 and F are events such that (U 1 ∧ ¬F ) and (U 2 ∧ ¬F ) are equivalent events, then Pr[
Definition of Broadcast Encryption Scheme
Since a public-key broadcast encryption is typically used by encrypting a session key s for the privileged users (this encryption is called the enabling block), and then symmetrically encrypting the "actual" message with s, we will often say that the goal of a Broadcast Encryption Scheme is to encapsulate [8] a session key s, rather than to encrypt a message M .
Definition 2 (Broadcast Encryption Scheme)
A Broadcast Encryption Scheme BE is a 4-tuple of poly-time algorithms (KeyGen, Reg, Enc, Dec), where:
• KeyGen, the key generation algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm used by the center to set up all the parameters of the scheme. KeyGen takes as input a security parameter 1 λ and a revocation threshold z (i.e. the maximum number of users that can be revoked) and generates the public key P K and the master secret key SK BE .
• Reg, the registration algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm used by the center to compute the secret initialization data needed to construct a new decoder each time a new user subscribes to the system. Reg receives as input the master key SK BE and a (new) index i associated with the user; it returns the user's secret key SK i .
• Enc, the encryption algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm used to encapsulate a given session key s within an enabling block T . Enc takes as input the public key P K, the session key s and a set R of revoked users (with |R| ≤ z) and returns the enabling block T .
• Dec, the decryption algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input the secret key SK i of user i and the enabling block T and returns the session key s that was encapsulated within T if i was a legitimate user when T was constructed, or the special symbol ⊥.
Security of Revocation
Intuitively, we would like to say that even if a malicious adversary A learns the secret keys of at most z users, and these users are later revoked, then subsequent broadcasts do not leak any information to such adversary. The security threat posed by such adversary is usually referred to as Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA), and a Broadcast Encryption Scheme withstanding such an attack is said to be z-Resilient against CPA. It is well known that such an attack is not powerful enough to model some realistic adversarial scenarios, e.g. in the presence of an insider who helps the adversary to get decryptions of arbitrary ciphertexts.
To be on the safe side, it is possible to consider the Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA2) in which the adversary is allowed to "play" with the decryption machinery as she wishes, subject only to the condition that she doesn't ask about enabling blocks closely related to her "challenge" T * . In formalizing the notion of "close relationship", the usual treatment is to impose a minimal restriction to the adversary, just disallowing her to submit the challenge itself to the decryption machinery. As already noted in [20, 1] , such a mild constraint does in turn restrict too much the class of schemes that can be proven secure, excluding even schemes that ought to be considered secure under a more intuitive notion. For this reason, it seems more reasonable to consider a variant of the CCA2, to which we will refer to as Generalized Chosen Ciphertext Attack (gCCA2), following the terminology introduced in [1] .
In a Generalized Chosen Ciphertext Attack, the set of enabling blocks the adversary is forbidden to ask about is defined in term of an efficiently computable equivalence relation ℜ(·, ·). In fact, in the case of a broadcast (as opposed to ordinary) encryption, there is no unique decryption machinery, since the decryption algorithm can be used with the secret key of any legitimate user. For this reason, in our setting we need to consider a family of efficient equivalence relations {ℜ i (·, ·)}, one for each user i. As in the regular case [1] , the equivalence relation ℜ i (·, ·) corresponding to each user i needs to be i-decryption-respecting: equivalent enabling blocks under ℜ i are guaranteed to have exactly the same decryption according to the secret data of user i. Finally, this family should form an explicit parameter of the scheme (i.e., one has to specify some decryption-respecting family {ℜ i } when proving the gCCA2 security of a given scheme).
Formal Model. We now formalize the above attack scenarios, starting with the CPA.
First, (P K, SK BE ) ← BE.KeyGen(1 λ , z) is run and the adversary A is given the public key P K. Then A enters the user corruption stage, where she is given oracle access to the User Corruption Oracle Cor SK BE (·). This oracle receives as input the index i of the user to be corrupted, computes SK i ← BE.Reg(SK BE , i) and returns the user's secret key SK i . This oracle can be called adaptively for at most z times. Let us say that at the end of this stage the set R of at most z users is corrupted.
In the second stage, a random bit σ is chosen, and A can query the Encryption Oracle (sometimes also called the left-or-right oracle) E P K,R,σ (·, ·) on any pair of session keys s 0 , s 1 . 1 This oracle returns Enc(P K, s σ , R). Without loss of generality (see [2] ), we can assume that the encryption oracle is called exactly once, and returns to A the challenge enabling block T * . At the end of this second stage, A outputs a bit σ * which she thinks is equal to σ. Define the advantage of A as Adv
Additionally, in the case of a Chosen Ciphertext Attack (generalized or not), A has also access to a Decryption Oracle D SK BE (·, ·), which she can query on any pair i, T , where i is the index of some user and T is any enabling block of her choice. A can call this oracle at any point during the execution (i.e., both in the first and in the second stage, arbitrarily interleaved with her other oracle calls). To prevent the adversary from directly decrypting her challenge T * , the decryption oracle first checks whether ℜ i (T , T * ) holds 2 : if so, D outputs ⊥; if not, D computes SK i ← BE.Reg(SK BE , i) and uses it to output BE.Dec(i, T ). As before, we define the corresponding advantages Adv Definition 3 (z-Resilience of a Broadcast Encryption Scheme) Let µ ∈ {CPA, gCCA2, CCA2}. We say that a Broadcast Encryption Scheme BE is z-resilient against a µ-type attack if the advantage, Adv µ BE,A (λ), of any probabilistic poly-time algorithm A is a negligible function of λ.
Revocation Schemes
In this section, we present three Broadcast Encryption Schemes, achieving z-resilience in an adaptive setting for the case of a CPA, gCCA2 and CCA2 attack respectively. Subsequent schemes build on the previous one, in a incremental way, so that it is possible to obtain increasing security at the cost of a slight efficiency loss.
Considering the subtlety of the arguments, our proofs follow the structural approach advocated in [8] defining a sequence of attack games G 0 , G 1 , . . . , all operating over the same underlying probability space. Starting from the actual adversarial game G 0 , we incrementally make slight modifications to the behavior of the oracles, thus changing the way the adversary's view is computed, while maintaining the view's distributions indistinguishable among the games. While this structural approach takes more space to write down, it is much less error-prone and much more understandable than a slicker "direct argument" (e.g., compare [7] and [8] ).
z-Resilience against CPA attack
As a warm-up before addressing the more challenging case of chosen ciphertext security, we describe a simpler CPA-secure scheme. Our scheme naturally builds upon previous works [19, 21] , but achieves a much more appropriate notion of adaptive security, which those previous schemes do not enjoy.
The Key Generation Algorithm. The first step in the key generation algorithm KeyGen(1 λ , z) is to define a group G of order q, for a random λ-bit-long prime q such that p = 2q + 1 is also prime, in which the DDH assumption is believed to hold. This is accomplished selecting a random prime q with the above two properties and a random element g 1 of order q modulo p: the group G is then set to be the subgroup of Z * p generated by g 1 , i.e. G = {g i 1 mod p : i ∈ Z q } ⊂ Z * p . A random w ← R Z q is then chosen and used to compute g 2 = g w 1 .
(In what follows, all computations are mod q in the exponent, and mod p elsewhere.) Then, the key generation algorithm selects two random z-degree polynomials 3 Z 1 (ξ) and Z 2 (ξ) over Z q , and computes the values:
. Finally, the pair (P K, SK BE ) is given in output, where P K .
The Registration Algorithm. Each time a new user i > z (in all our schemes, we reserve the first indices 0 . . . z for "special purposes"), decides to subscribe to the system, the center provides him with a decoder box containing the secret key:
The Encryption Algorithm. The encryption algorithm Enc is given in Figure 1 . It receives as input the public key P K, a session key s and a set R = {j 1 , . . . , j z } of revoked users and returns the enabling block T . If there are less than z revoked users, the remaining indices are set to 1 . . . (z − |R|), which are never given to any "real" user.
The Decryption Algorithm. If a legitimate user i wants to recover the session key embedded in the enabling block T = S, u 1 , u 2 , (j 1 , H j 1 ), . . . , (j z , H jz ) , he can proceed as in Figure 2 . If i is a revoked user (i.e. i ∈ {j 1 , . . . , j z }), the algorithm fails in step D2, since the interpolation points j 1 , . . . , j z , i are not pairwise distinct.
Security. As shown in the theorem below, the z-resilience of the above scheme relies on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption.
3 For conciseness, we will use the following notation: Proof: We define a sequence of "indistinguishable" games G 0 , . . ., where G 0 is the original game, and the last game clearly gives no advantage to the adversary.
Game G 0 . In game G 0 , A receives the public key P K and adaptively queries the corruption oracle Cor SK BE (·). Then, she queries the encryption oracle E P K,R,σ (·,·) on (s 0 , s 1 ), where R must contain all users that A compromised through the oracle Cor SK BE (·); A receives back the enabling block T * . At this point, A outputs her guess σ * ∈ {0, 1}. Let T 0 be the event that σ = σ * in game G 0 .
Game G 1 . Game G 1 is identical to game G 0 , except that, in game G 1 , step E4 of the encryption algorithm in Figure 1 , is replaced with the following:
By the properties of the Lagrange Interpolation in the Exponent, it is clear that step E4 ′ computes the same values H t , t = 0 . . . z as step E4. The point of this change is just to make explicit any functional dependency of the above quantities on u 1 and u 2 . Let T 1 be the event that σ = σ * in game
Game G 2 . To turn game G 1 into game G 2 we make another change to the encryption oracle used in game G 1 . In game G 2 steps E1, E3 are replaced with the following:
Let T 2 be the event that σ = σ * in game G 2 . Notice that while in game G 1 the values u 1 and u 2 are obtained using the same value r 1 , in game G 2 they are independent subject to r 1 = r 2 . Therefore, using a standard reduction argument, any non-negligible difference in behavior between G 1 and G 2 can be used to construct a PPT algorithm A 1 that is able to distinguish Diffie-Hellman tuples from totally random tuples with non negligible advantage. Hence, Pr[
Game G 3 . To define game G 3 , we again modify the encryption oracle as follows:
Let T 3 be the event that σ = σ * in game G 3 . Because of this last change, the challenge no longer contains σ, nor does any other information in the adversary's view; therefore, we have that Pr[T 3 ] = 1 2 . Moreover, we can prove (see Appendix 4.3, Lemma 9) , that the adversary has the same chances to guess σ in both game G 2 and G 3 , i.e. Pr[
Finally, combining all the intermediate results together, we can conclude that adversary A's advantage is negligible; more precisely: Adv
A comparison with the CPA schemes of [19, 21] . Our CPA scheme extends those proposed in [19, 21] by using two generators. This improvement turns out to be crucial: the adaptive security of our CPA scheme hinges heavily upon this change. In particular, the presence of two generators plays a key role in the reduction from the DDH problem mentioned in the description of game G 2 in Theorem 4. More specifically, when setting up the simulation of the adaptive attack scenario (defined in Section 3.1), the two distinct generators used in the public key of the scheme provide the perfect place where to embed the first two elements g 1 and g 2 of the DDH "challenge" at hand. Doing so, the simulator can choose the rest of the public key in a "honest" way, and hence it will know all the corresponding secret keys (i.e. the polynomials Z 1 (ξ) and Z 2 (ξ)). This in turn allows the simulator to answer any corruption query that the adversary may want to carry out before querying the encryption oracle. On the contrary, the use of a single generator in both CPA schemes of [19, 21] leads to a reduction in which the simulator does not know the entire secret key (in particular, the constant term of the secret polynomial is unknown to the simulator; cfr. Theorem 1 of [21] ). As a consequence, there seems to be no way to answer corruption queries, so that the adaptive attack scenario from Section 3.1 cannot be properly simulated: thus the reduction argument does not go through.
z-Resilience against gCCA2 Attack
Once we have constructed a Broadcast Encryption Scheme z-resilient against CPA attacks, it is natural to try to devise an extension achieving adaptive chosen ciphertext security. This was already attempted by [21] , but they do not elaborate (neither formally nor informally) on what an "adaptive chosen ciphertext attack" on a Broadcast Encryption Scheme exactly is. As a consequence, in Theorem 3 of [21] , the authors only show the security of their scheme against an adversary that does not participate in the system, wheareas (as we will argue at the end of this section) their scheme is certainly not CCA2-secure with respect to even a single malicious revoked user.
To achieve CCA2 security, we will first try to apply the standard technique of [7, 8] to the scheme presented in Section 4.1. Unfortunately, this natural approach does not completely solve the CCA2 problem; still, it leads us to an interesting scheme that achieves the (sligthly weaker) notion of generalized chosen ciphertext security.
The Key Generation Algorithm. As before, the first task of the key generation algorithm is to select a random group G ⊂ Z * p of prime order q and two random generators g 1 , g 2 ∈ G. Then, KeyGen selects six random z-degree polynomials 4 
and Z 2 (ξ) over Z q , and computes the values c t . = g
2 , for t = 0 . . . z. 4 For conciseness, we will use the following notation:
Finally, KeyGen chooses at random a hash function H from a family F of collision resistant hash functions, 5 and outputs the pair (P K, SK BE ), where P K .
The Registration Algorithm. Each time a new user i > z subscribes to the system, the center provides him with a decoder box containing the secret key SK i .
The Encryption Algorithm. Using the idea of [7, 8] , in order to obtain non-malleable ciphertexts, we "tag" each encrypted message so that it can be verified before proceeding with the actual decryption. In the broadcast encryption scenario, where each user has a different decryption key, the tag cannot be a single point -we need to distribute an entire EXP-polynomial V(x). This is accomplished appending z + 1 tags to the ciphertext: each user i first computes the tag v i using his private key and then verifies the validity of the ciphertext by checking the interpolation of the z + 1 values in point i against its v i .
The encryption algorithm Enc receives as input the public key P K, the session key s to be embedded within the enabling block and a set R = {j 1 , . . . , j z } of revoked users. It proceeds as described in Figure 3 , and finally it outputs T . The Decryption Algorithm. If a legitimate user i wants to recover the session key embedded in the enabling block T = S, u 1 , u 2 , (j 1 , H j 1 ), . . . , (j z , H jz ), v 0 , . . . , v z , he can proceed as in Figure 4 . If i is a revoked user, the algorithm fails in step D6, since the interpolation points j 1 , . . . , j z , i are not pairwise distinct.
Security. As mentioned above, the presence of many decryption keys leads to the use of an EXP-polynomial V(x) to tag the encryption of the message. This in turn makes the ciphertext malleable: since each user i can verify the value of V(x) only in one point, the adversary can modify the v j 's values and construct a different EXP-polynomial V ′ (x) intersecting V(x) at point i -thus fooling user i to accept as valid a corrupted ciphertext. In the next section we show a non-trivial solution to this problem; here, we assess the z-resilience of the Broadcast Encryption Scheme presented above against a gCCA2 attack. As already discussed in Section 3.1, to this aim it is necessary to introduce a family of equivalence relations {ℜ i }: intuitively, two ciphertexts T and T ′ are equivalent for user i if they have the same "data" components, and the tag "relevant to user i" is correctly verified, i.e. v i = v ′ i (even though other "irrelevant" tags could be different). Clearly, this relation is efficiently computable and i-decryption-respecting.
s ← S/EXP-LI(j 1 , . . . , j z , i; H j 1 , . . . , H jz , H i )(0)
. Given a user i, and the two enabling blocks
we say that T is equivalent to T ′ with respect to user i, and we write ℜ i (T , T ′ ), if the two EXP-polynomials V(x) and V ′ (x) intersect at point i, i.e.
Theorem 6 If the DDH Problem is hard in G and H is chosen from a collision-resistant hash functions family F, then the above Broadcast Encryption Scheme is z-resilient against generalized chosen ciphertext attacks, under the family of equivalence relations {ℜ i }.
Proof: To prove this theorem, we pursue the same approach as in the proof of Theorem 4, where the starting scenario of the sequence of games is defined as in the definition of the adaptive gCCA2 attack.
Game G 0 . Recall that in game G 0 , A receives the public key P K and adaptively interleaves queries to the corruption oracle Cor SK BE (·) with queries to the decryption oracle D SK BE (·, ·). Then, she queries the encryption oracle E P K,R,σ (·, ·) on (s 0 , s 1 ), where R must contain all users that A compromised through the oracle Cor SK BE (·); A receives back the enabling block T * . Then, A can again query the decryption oracle D SK BE (i, T ), restricted only in that ¬ℜ i (T , T * ). Finally, she outputs her guess σ * ∈ {0, 1}. Let T 0 be the event that σ = σ * in game G 0 .
Game G 1 . Game G 1 is identical to game G 0 , except that, in game G 1 , steps E4, E8 of the encryption algorithm in Figure 3 , are replaced with the following:
By the properties of the Lagrange Interpolation in the Exponent, it is clear that step E4 ′ computes the same values H jt , t = 0 . . . z as steps E4; similarly, step E8 ′ computes the same values v t , t = 0 . . . z as step E8. The point of these changes is just to make explicit any functional dependency of the above quantities on u 1 and u 2 .
Let T 1 be the event that σ = σ * in game G 1 . Clearly, it holds that Pr[
Game G 3 . To define game G 3 we slightly modify the decryption oracle: instead of using the algorithm in Figure 4 , in game G 3 steps D2, D4, D5 are replaced with the following:
The rationale behind these changes is that we want to strengthen the condition that the enabling block has to meet in order to be considered valid and hence to be decrypted. This will make it easier to show the security of the scheme; however, for these changes to be useful, there should be no observable difference in the way invalid enabling blocks are "caught" in games G 2 and G 3 . To make it formal, we now introduce the following two events: let T 3 be the event that σ = σ * in game G 3 , and let R 3 be the event that A submits some decryption query that would have been decrypted in game G 2 but is rejected in game G 3 ; in other words, R 3 is the event that some decryption query that would have passed the test in step D4 of the decryption oracle used in game G 2 , fails to pass the test in step D4 ′ used in game G 3 . Clearly, G 2 and G 3 are identical until event R 3 occurs; hence, if R 3 never occurs, the adversary has the same chances to win in both the two games, i.e. (using Lemma 1)
To bound the last probability, we consider two more games, G 4 and G 5 .
Game G 4 . To define game G 4 , we again modify the encryption oracle as follows:
Let T 4 be the event that σ = σ * in game G 4 . Because of this last change, the challenge no longer contains the bit σ, nor does any other information in the adversary's view; therefore, we have that Pr[T 4 ] = 1 2 . Let R 4 be the event that A submits some decryption query that would have been decrypted in game G 2 but is rejected in game G 4 ; in other words, R 4 is the event that some decryption query that would have passed the test in step D4 of the decryption oracle used in game G 2 , fails to pass the test in step D4 ′ used in game G 4 . In Appendix 4.3, we prove (Lemma 10) that those events happen with the same probability as the corresponding events of game Game G 5 . In this game, we again modify the decryption algorithm, adding the following special rejection rule, whose goal is to prevent the adversary from submitting illegal enabling blocks to the decryption oracle, once she has received her challenge.
. . , v * z , the decryption oracle rejects any query i, T , with
) , but α = α * , and it does so before executing the test in step D4 ′ .
Notice that in the gCCA2 setting the adversary is not allowed to query the decryption oracle Dec(i, T ) on enabling blocks ℜ i -equivalent to the challenge T * . Therefore, when the special rejection rule is applied, we already know that it holds ¬ℜ i (T , T * ).
Let C 5 be the event that the adversary submits a decryption query that is rejected using the above special rejection rule; let R 5 be the event that A submits some decryption query that would have passed the test in step D4 of the decryption oracle used in game G 2 , but fails to pass the test in step D4 ′ used in game G 5 . Notice that this implies that such a query passed the ℜ iequivalence test and the special rejection rule, because otherwise step D4 ′ wouldn't have been executed. Clearly, G 4 and G 5 are identical until event C 5 occurs, i.e.
, where the implication follows from Lemma 1.
Our final task is to show that events C 5 and R 5 occur with negligible probability: while the argument to bound event C 5 is based on the collision resistance assumption for the family F (using a standard reduction argument, we can construct a PPT algorithm A 2 that breaks the collision resistance assumption with non negligible advantage), the argument to bound event R 5 hinges upon the fact that the adversary is not allowed to submit queries that are "ℜ i -related" to her challenge, and upon information-theoretic considerations (as proven in A comparison with the CCA2 attempt of [21] . As already noticed when describing the encryption algorithm, in the broadcast encryption setting it is not safe to use a single point as validating tag; it is for that reason that in our gCCA2 solution we use a validating EXP-polynomial V(x). On the contrary, in [21] the authors didn't recognize the inherent insecurity of using a single tag and proposed a scheme that not only uses a single generator, but also tags ciphertexts with just one point. Consequently, the information distributed to the users of the system to enable them to check the validity of a given ciphertext (namely, x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 in the notation of [21] ) is the same for all participants. To verify the validity of a ciphertext T , a user recomputes the taḡ v = F This means that revoking a user does not affect his/her ability to check the validity of a ciphertext; furthermore, validating a ciphertext is effectively equivalent to computing the corresponding tag. This implies that any revoked user is able to construct new, legal ciphertexts from any encrypted message; in other words, ciphertexts are malleable and hence the scheme cannot be CCA2 secure. More precisely, even an adversary that non-adaptively corrupts just a single user, can break the scheme with a single decryption query: upon receiving the challenge ciphertext from the encryption oracle, the adversary changes it in some easily-reversible way, computes the proper tag (exploiting the knowledge of x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 that she got from the revoked user) and asks the decryption oracle to decrypt such modified ciphertext. Once the adversary gets the decrypted message back, she can easily tell which message was hidden within her challenge, breaking the scheme.
z-Resilience against CCA2 Attack
In Section 4.2, we saw how a direct application of the standard technique of [7, 8] does not provide a complete solution to the CCA2 problem, but only suffices for gCCA2 security. As proven in Lemma 11 (see Appendix 4.3), the restriction imposed by the gCCA2 attack (namely, forbidding the adversary to submit decryption queries i, T such that ℜ i (T , T * ) holds) is essential for the security of the previous Broadcast Encryption Scheme. Indeed, given a challenge T * with tag sequence v 0 . . . v z , it is trivial to come up with a different sequence v ′ 0 . . . v ′ z such that v i = v ′ i , resulting in a "different" enabling block T ′ = T * : however, Dec(i, T * ) = Dec(i, T ′ ), allowing the adversary to "break" the CCA2 security.
Although we feel that gCCA2 security is enough for most applications of Broadcast Encryption Schemes, it is possible to non-trivially modify the Broadcast Encryption Scheme presented in Section 4.2 to obtain CCA2 security (with only a slight efficiency loss). The modified scheme, presented in this section, maintains the same Key Generation and Registration algorithms described before; the essential modifications involve the operations used to construct the enabling block. In particular, to achieve CCA2 security, it is necessary to come up with some trick to make the tag sequence v 0 , . . . , v z non-malleable. To this aim, we will use any secure (deterministic) message authentication code (MAC) to guarantee the integrity of the entire sequence. In fact, we only need any one-time MAC, satisfying the following simple property: given a (unique) correct value MAC k (M ) for some message M (under key k), it is infeasible to come up with a correct (unique)
The Encryption Algorithm. The encryption algorithm Enc receives as input the public key P K, the session key s to be embedded within the enabling block and a set R = {j 1 , . . . , j z } of revoked users. To construct the enabling block T , the encryption algorithm (defined in Figure 3 ) operates similarly to the gCCA2 encryption algorithm: the main difference is that now a MAC key k, randomly chosen from the MAC key space K, is used to MAC the tag sequence v 0 , . . . , v z , and is encapsulated within T along with the session key s. The Decryption Algorithm. If a legitimate user i wants to recover the session key embedded in the enabling block T = S, u 1 , u 2 , (j 1 , H j 1 ) , . . . , (j z , H jz ) , he can proceed as in Figure 6 . If i is a revoked user, the algorithm fails in step D6, since the interpolation points j 1 , . . . , j z , i are not pairwise distinct.
else return s D11. else return ⊥ Security. The security analysis for this scheme is very subtle, because there is the risk of circularity in the use of the MAC key k. Namely, k is part of the ciphertext (since it is encapsulated, along with the session key s, within S); this means that α, the hash of the ciphertext, depends on k (at least Information-Theoretically), and thus the sequence of tags depends on k. In other words, we are MAC-ing something that depends on the MAC key k, which could be a problem. Luckily, the Information-Theoretic nature of the structural approach to the security analysis that we are pursuing (following [8] ) allows us to prove that actually k is completely hidden within S, so that MAC-ing the resulting tag with k is still secure.
The solution to the CCA2 problem for Broadcast Encryption Schemes and the relative security analysis can be viewed as the main technical contribution of this paper; at the same time, the capability to resolve the apparent circularity in the use of the MAC demonstrates the importance of providing a formal model and precise definitions, without which it would have been much harder to devise a correct proof of security for the above scheme.
Theorem 7
If the DDH Problem is hard in G, H is chosen from a collision-resistant hash functions family F and MAC is a one-time message authentication code, then the above Broadcast Encryption Scheme is z-resilient against chosen ciphertext attacks.
Proof:
The proof proceeds defining a sequence of games similar to that presented in Theorem 6. The definition of games G 0 , . . . , G 5 closely follow the exposition given in Theorem 6: however, the statements of all lemmas (and their proofs) need to be changed to accommodate for the use of the MAC. In particular, we can easily state and prove a lemma analogous to Lemma 10, where the only difference is the presence of information about the MAC key k in the challenge (see Lemma 12) . More importantly, to bound the probability Pr[R 5 ] we introduce a new game G 6 to deal with the use of the MAC in the enabling block, while a lemma similar to Lemma 11 is used to bound the probability of event R 6 defined in game G 6 (see Appendix 4.3 for the details on the proofs).
Game G 6 . To define this game, we modify the decryption algorithm, adding the following second special rejection rule, whose goal is to detect illegal enabling blocks submitted by the adversary to the decryption oracle, once she has received her challenge. Notice that, while the special rejection rule, defined in game G 5 , is used to reject adversary's queries aiming at exploiting any weakness in the collision-resistant hash family F, the second special rejection rule is used to reject ciphertexts aiming at exploiting any weakness in the MAC scheme.
After A receives her challenge
. . , v * z , τ * , the decryption oracle rejects any query i, T , with
, and it does so before executing the test in step D4 ′ , and before applying the special rejection rule.
Let M 6 be the event that the adversary submits a decryption query that is rejected in game G 6 using the second special rejection rule; let C 6 be the event that the adversary submits a decryption query that is rejected in game G 6 using the special rejection rule; let R 6 be the event that A submits some decryption query that would have passed both the test in step D4 and in step D8 of the decryption oracle used in game G 2 , but fails to pass the test in step D4 ′ used in game G 6 . Notice that this implies that such a query passed both the second special rejection rule and the special rejection rule, because otherwise step D4 ′ wouldn't have been executed at all. Event M 6 is closely related to the security of the one time MAC used in the scheme; in particular, any difference in behavior between game G 5 and game G 6 can be used to construct a PPT algorithm A 3 that is able to forge a legal authentication code under a one-message attack with non-negligible probability, thus breaking the MAC scheme. Hence, Pr[M 6 ] ≤ ǫ 3 , for some negligible ǫ 3 .
Moreover, since G 5 and G 6 are identical until event M 6 occurs, if it doesn't occur at all, they will proceed identically; i.e., by Lemma 1:
Our final task is to bound the probability that events C 6 and R 6 occur: the argument to bound Pr [C 6 ] is based on the collision resistance assumption for the family F, while the argument to bound Pr[R 6 ] hinges upon information-theoretic considerations (as proven in Appendix 4.3, Lemma 13).
From those facts, we obtain that Pr[C 6 ] ≤ ǫ 2 and Pr[
, where ǫ 2 is a negligible quantity and Q A (λ) is an upper bound on the number of decryption queries made by the adversary.
Finally, combining the intermediate results, we can conclude that adversary A's advantage is negligible; more precisely:
According to the specification of game G 3 , [e * ] 3 is chosen uniformly over Z q , independently from V and Z 0 . Hence, to reach the thesis, it suffices to prove that the distribution of [e * ] 2 , conditioned on V and Z 0 , is also uniform in Z q .
In game G 2 , the quantities (V, Z 0 , [e * ] 2 ) are related according to the following matrix equation:
where det(M ) = w(r * 2 − r * 1 ) = 0, since r * 2 = r * 1 . As soon as we fix the value of V , the matrix M is completely fixed, but the values Z 1,0 and Z 2,0 are still uniformly and independently distributed over Z q . Now, fixing a value for Z 0 also fixes a value for s σ ; hence, by Lemma 8, we can conclude that the conditioned distribution of [e * ] 2 , w.r.t. V and Z 0 , is also uniform over Z q .
Proofs of Lemmas stated in Theorem 6
Lemma 10 Pr[
Proof: Consider the quantity:
and the value Z 0 . Introducing similar notations as in Lemma 9 and reasoning as above, we can notice that event T According to the specification of game G 4 , [e * ] 4 is chosen uniformly over Z q , independently from V and Z 0 . Hence, to reach the thesis, it suffices to prove that the distribution of [e * ] 3 , conditioned on V and Z 0 , is also uniform in Z q .
In game G 3 , the quantities (V, Z 0 , [e * ] 3 ) are related according to the following matrix equation:
where det(M ) = w(r * 2 − r * 1 ) = 0, since r * 2 = r * 1 . As soon as we fix the value of V , the matrix M is completely fixed, but the values Z 1,0 and Z 2,0 are still uniformly and independently distributed over Z q . Now, fixing a value for Z 0 also fixes a value for s σ ; hence, by Lemma 8, we can conclude that the conditioned distribution of [e * ] 3 , w.r.t. V and Z 0 , is also uniform over Z q .
Lemma 11
If Q A (λ) is an upper bound on the number of decryption queries that A poses to the decryption algorithm, then Pr[
Proof: In what follows, for 1 ≤ j ≤ Q A (λ), we will denote with R (j) 5 the event that the j th ciphertext i, T , submitted by A to the decryption oracle in game G 5 , fails to pass the test in step D4 ′ , but would have passed the test in step D4 in game G 2 . Besides, for 1 ≤ j ≤ Q A (λ), we will denote with B (j) 5 the event that the j th ciphertext is submitted to the decryption oracle before A received her challenge, and withB To prove this claim, fix 1 ≤ j ≤ Q A (λ) and consider the quantities:
These two quantities together contain all the randomness needed to determine the behavior of A and of all the oracles she interacts with, up to the moment that A performs the encryption query: once we fix V and V ′ , we totally define how the adversary proceeds in her attack, before she receives her challenge back. Moreover, fixing V and V ′ , the event B
(j) 5 is completely defined: given V and V ′ , we say they are relevant, if the event B (j) 5 occurs. Hence, to reach the claim, it suffice to prove that the probability of event R Recall that the condition tested in step D4 ′ in game G 5 is (u 2 = u w 1 ∧ v i =v i ): since we are considering the case that the j th query fails to pass the test in step D4 ′ , but would have passed the test in step D4 of game G 2 , it must be the case that v i =v i but u 2 = u w 1 . Therefore, we only consider relevant values of V and V ′ such that u 2 = u w 1 . Taking the logs (base g 1 ), the condition u 2 = u w 1 is equivalent to r 1 = r 2 and the condition v i =v i is equivalent to β i =β i , whereβ i . = log g 1v i = r 1 X 1,i + wr 2 X 2,i + αr 1 Y 1,i + αwr 2 Y 2,i and β i . = log g 1 v i = LI(0, . . . , z; log g 1 v 0 , . . . , log g 1 v z )(i). Notice thatβ i can be expressed in terms of the vector (X 1,0 , X 2,0 , . . . , X 1,z , X 2,z , Y 1,0 , Y 2,0 , . . . , Y 1,z , Y 2,z ) T ; indeed, X 1,i = LI(0, . . . , z; X 1,0 , . . . , X 1,z )(i) = z t=0 (X 1,t · λ t (i)), and similar relations hold for X 2,i , Y 1,i and Y 2,i . Therefore, by means of some matrix manipulation, we can write:
T where δ ≡ (δ 0 , δ 1 , . . . , δ 2z , δ 2z+1 , δ 2z+2 , δ 2z+3 , . . . , δ 4z+2 , δ 4z+3 ) is defined as: δ . = (r 1 λ 0 (i), wr 2 λ 0 (i), . . . , r 1 λ z (i), wr 2 λ z (i), αr 1 λ 0 (i), αwr 2 λ 0 (i), . . . , αr 1 λ z (i), αwr 2 λ z (i)).
In game G 5 , the random values defined above are related according to the following matrix equation: . . .
We want to show that the rank of the matrix M is 2z + 3. Clearly, the first 2z + 2 rows are linearly independent; to see why the last row (i.e. the vector δ) is independent from the others, notice that the only way to obtain δ 0 is by multiplying the first row by r 1 λ 0 (i): doing so, the second component of δ results to be wr 1 λ 0 (i). But since δ 1 = wr 2 λ 0 (i), this implies that r 1 = r 2 , contradicting the assumption that the query fails to pass the test in step D4 ′ in game G 5 .
As soon as we fix V , the first 2z+2 rows of matrix M are fixed, but the values X 1,0 , X 2,0 , . . . , Y 1,z , Y 2,z are still uniformly and independently distributed over Z q ; as for δ, its value is still undetermined, since r 1 , r 2 and i are not yet fixed. Now, fixing a value for V ′ such that V and V ′ are relevant and that r 1 = r 2 , determines the value of the j th query (and hence the value of δ), along with the values X 0 , . . . , X z , Y 0 , . . . , Y z andβ i . Therefore, by Lemma 8, we can conclude that the distribution ofβ i , conditioned on relevant values of V and V ′ , is uniform over Z q ; since conditioning on any fixed, relevant value of V and V ′ , β i is just a single point in Z q , it follows that Pr[β i =β i ] = where β * i . = log g 1 v * i = LI(0, . . . , z; log g 1 v * 0 , . . . , log g 1 v * z )(i) and i > z. Notice that by the specification of the encryption oracle used in game G 5 , it holds that: log g 1 v * t = r * 1 X 1,t + wr * 2 X 2,t + α * r * 1 Y 1,t + α * wr * 2 Y 2,t , t = 0, . . . , z. Therefore, we can write:
λ t (i)(r * 1 X 1,t + wr * 2 X 2,t + α * r * 1 Y 1,t + α * wr * 2 Y 2,t ).
Together, V and V ′ contain all the parameters needed to determine the behavior of A and of all the oracles she interacts with: once we fix V and V ′ , we totally define how the adversary proceeds in the entire attack. Moreover, fixing V and V ′ , the eventB (j) 5 is completely defined: given V and V ′ , we say they are relevant, if the eventB (j) 5 occurs. Hence, to reach the claim, it suffices to prove that the probability of event R (j) 5 , conditioned on any relevant values of V and V ′ , is less then 1/q.
As shown above, we can consider just relevant values of V and V ′ for which it holds that u 2 = u w 1 . Reasoning as in the previous case, and maintaining the notation introduced there, the random values defined above are related according to the following matrix equation:
. . . 
